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CASES NOTED
followed other jurisdictions wherein the remedy is not exclusive, and ruled
out such damage under the survival statute. The decision, though consistent
with other jurisdictions, results in an anomaly in that it is cheaper to kill
than to maim under tire Florida statutes. This situation arises in Florida
due to the peculiar wording of the Florida Wrongful Death Act which
allows an action only to the beneficiary, himself, and limits damages to
the anount that the party entitled to sue may have sustained by the
death. Here, where the husband has no legal right to his wife's earnings,
he cannot claim damages for impairment under the wrongful death act.
This situation does not arise in jurisdictions which follow the English
act more closely. Under these acts a representative sues for the benefit
of all beneficiaries; therefore, the judgment is not limited to the amount
recoverable by any one beneficiary.
The anomalous situations presented by this case is, as the court points
out, a matter for legislative action rather than for judicial re-interpretation




Testator devised a portion of his estate to his wife for life, residue
to a trustee to pay the income to the wife for life; both subject to the
conditions that the wife not remarry or use the money for the support
of their son. Held, in view of a Connecticut statute' requiring a parent
to support his children if they become poor and unable to support them-
selves, the condition concerning the son is contrary to public policy, is
uncertain, and therefore invalid. Zdanowich v. Shenvood, 19 Conn. Supp.
89, 110 A.2d 290 (1954).
It is generally held that a testator mnay impose any condition in his
will so long as it is definite and does not impose an impossibility or involve
illegality. 2  The test the courts seem to employ is to determine if the
result would induce conduct detrimental to the public interest. For
example, restrictions concerning family relationships that would involve
a breach of parental duty are held to be void; such as a prohibition of
social relations between mother and son,: relinquishing control of a child
to a stranger, 4 or requiring the separation of father and son.5 However, a
I. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 2610 (1949), as amended by CoN. C.N. STAT. Sup',.
§ lilc (1953).
2. Clemenson v. Resbsamen, 205 Ark. 123, 168 S.W.2d 195 (1943); Thompson
v. Thompson, 175 S.W.2d 885 (Mo. 1943); In re Houston's Estate, 371 Pa. 396,
89 A.2d 525 (1952).
3. In re Ranney's Estate, 161 Misc. 626, 250 N.Y.Supp. 680 (Surr. Ct. 1936).
4. In re Carplesl Estate, 140 Misc. 459, 250 NX.Supp. 603 (Surr. Ct. 1931).
5. In re Forte's Will, 149 Misc. 327, 267 N.Y.Supp. 603 (Surf. Ct. 1933).
I
494 MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
condition prohibiting the devisee from residing with her relatives in the
testator's home has been held valid.0
As early as 1711,7 it was held that a condition in a will contrary to
public policy is unenforceable and void.8  The condition is simply dis-
regarded; that is, the remaining portion is read as if the condition were
not there.0
At early common law there was no obligation for a parent to support
his adult incapacitated children,' but American courts realized the moral
duty, and either by statute or judicial decision established a legal duty
as well. In Pera v. Perla" the court said,
.I .Generally the obligation of a parent to support a child ceases
when the child reaches majority, but an exception arises when
the child is from physical or mental deficiencies unable to support
himself ....
This view is followed by the majority of jurisdictions, 12 although some
courts imply a legal duty only when the child has the impediment at the
time of reaching majority. In the present case the father was clearly
trying to deprive his son of any of his estate, either directly or indirectly.
The son was past the age of majority and was under no handicap. The
mother was under no legal obligation to support or aid her son, at
that time.
While the primary rule in the construction of a will is to give effect
to the testator's intent' 4 it is obvious that in the present case the court
failed to do so. In the construction of a will, as in any other written
instrument, the courts consider such instruments to be drafted in corn-
6. Latorracia v. Latorracia, 132 N.J.Eq. 40, 26 A.2d 522 (1942) aff'd Latorracia
v. Latorracia, 133 N.J.Eq. 2, 31 A.2d 819 (1943).
7. Mitchel v. Reynolds, I P. Wms. 181 (Eng. 1711).
8. Girard Trust Co. v. Schmitz, 129 N.Eq. 444, 20 A.2d 21 (Ch. 1941);
Parmenter v. Pennsylvania Co., 122 N.J.Eq. 25, 192 AtI. 63 (Ch. 1937); In re Dettmer's
Will, 262 App. Div. 1032, 30 N.Y.S.2d 333 (1941).
9. Griffin v. Sturges, 131 Conn. 471, 40 A.2d 758 (1944); Iloss v. Hoss, 140
Ind. 551, 39 N.E. 255 (1894); LaMere v. Jackson, 288 Mich. 99, 284 N.W. 659
(1939); Jones v. Jones, 223 Mo. 424, 123 S.W. 29 (1909); Lynch v. Melton, 150
N.C. 595, 64 S.E. 497 (1894). Contra, In re Murrow's Vill, 41 N.M. 723, 73 P.2d
1360 (1937). See, In re Cooper's Will, 75 N.J.Eq. 1177, 71 At. 676 (Prerog. Ct.
1909. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 424 comment d, § 425 comment h, § 426
comment c, § 427 comment f, § 428 comment e, § 429 comment J. (1935).
10. In re Hoffman's Estate, 261 App. Div. 556, 26 U.Y.S.2d 430 (1941).
11. 58 So.2d 689, 690 (Fla. 1952).
12. Howard v. United States, 2 F.2d 170 (E.D. Ky. 1924); Zakrocki v. Zakrocki,
115 Ind. 556, 60 N.E.2d 745 (1945); Humboldt County v. Bregger, 232 Iowa 494,
4 N.W.2d 422 (1942); Williams v. West, 258 S.W.2d 468 (Ky. 1953); Brochert
v. Brochert, 185 Md. 586, 45 A.2d 463 (1946); Schnltz v. Western Farm Tractor Co.,
111 Wash. 351, 190 Pac. 1007 (1920).
13. Murrah v. Baites, 255 Ala. 178, 50 So.2d 735 (1951); Breuer v. Dowden, 207
Ky. 12, 268 S.W. 541 (1925); Wells v. Wells, 227 N.C. 614, 44 S.E.2d 31 (1947).
14. Evans v. Ockershansen, 100 F.2d 695 (D.C.Cir. 1938); Wright v. Sallet,
66 So.2d 237 (Fla. 1953); Perkins v. O'Donald, 77 Fla. 710, 82 So. 401 (1919).
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pliance with existing laws.' 5 When a will or any part thereof is open
to two interpretations, one of which is illegal or invalid, the valid inter-
pretation should be adopted as expressive of the true testamentary intent. 6
The court in interpreting a will should indulge every legal presumption
in favor of validity of the will. 17
As the courts, wherever possible, should presume that the testator
intended to comply with the law, rather than to break it, it is felt that
the will should have been given effect so long as the son was not
incapacitated.
PnmuP W. KNIGHT
WITNESSES-EXCLUSION FROM COURTROOM WHILE
OTHERS TESTIFY
A trial judge refused to excuse appellant's witness, a psychiatrist, from
the rule excluding a witness from the court room while others are testifying.
Held, the discretion of a trial judge governs those witnesses who are to be
excused f'om this rule, and his decision will not be reversed unless it
is prejudicial to the party complaining. McVeigh v. State, 73 So.2d 694
(Fla. 1954).
The separation of witnesses, for the purpose of exposing inconsistencies
in their testimony, has long been practiced. Like most of our jurisprudence
it is said to descend from the common law of England but its inception
is indeed much older.' Though brought to America by that medium, the
first report of separating witnesses in a trial is recorded in the book of
15. Cleveland Clinic Foundation v. Humphries, 97 F.2d 849, 855 (6th Cir.
1938) (". . . the golden rule of interpretation is the intent of the testator which should
be made to conform to the rules of law which it is presumed the testator knew and
considered when drafting his wil.") Cf. In re Nugen's Estate, 223 Iowa 428, 272 N.W.
239 (1937)(A gift to farm a charitable library with reference to administration duties
which were in conflict with statutory regulations was upheld, the gift being subjected
to the statute); In re Griffin's Vill, 159 Misc. 12, 287 N.Y.Supp. 514 (Surr. Ct.
1936) (Existing laws held incorporated into wills as into every other document).
16. Fussey v. White, 113 Ill. Rep. 637 (18851; Rotch v. Emerson, 105 Mass.
431, 433 (1870); Oennett v. Dennett, 40 N.H. 498, 500 (1860); Coon v. Coon. 38
Misc. 693, 78 N.Y.Supp. 245 (1902); Post v. Hoover, 33 N.Y.Supp. 593 (Ct. of
App. 1865); Atkinson v. Hutchinson, 3 P. Wims. 258, 260 (Eng. 1734):
"Where words are capable of a twofold construction even in the case
of a deed (and much more of a will), it is just and reasonable that such
construction should be received as tends to make it good.
17. Cartinhour v. Houser, 66 So.2d 686 (Fla. 1953).
18. Hooper v. Stokes, 107 Fla. 607, 145 So. 855 (1933) (Testator's express intent
will determine the interpretation of a will, though the will is harsh and unnatural);
Vanroy v. Hoover, 96 Fla. 194, 117 So. 887 (1928); Newman v. Smith, 77 Fla. 633,
82 So. 236 (1918); Eberlin v. Brunner, 233 Mo. App. 563, 123 S.W.2d 543 (1939);
In re Bose's Estate, 136 Neb. 156, 285 N.W. 319 (1939).
1. TRIBBLE, FLA. EVIDENCE § 4757, p. 1061.
